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Abstract: We investigate the effect of financial reporting complexity on stock comovement. We 
hypothesize that investors deal with complexity increases by acquiring low cost information. 
This information is typically informative not just about the firm of interest but also about other 
firms with similar fundamentals, which generates excess comovement. We find that increases in 
10-Q word counts, a complexity proxy, are consistently followed by increases in 1) internet 
searches about the firm and 2) R2s from regressions between the firm’s returns and its peers’. On 
a large scale, complexity-induced comovement might hinder investors' ability to discriminate 
across stocks and identify business innovators. 
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“The topic of disclosure overload and complexity has been addressed by multiple organizations 
over many years. Some users of financial information seem to have an insatiable appetite for 
more information. Others observe that finding the truly significant information among the 
volume of routine and otherwise uninformative information is a challenge.” 
                     Disclosure Overload and Complexity: Hidden in Plain Sight 
KPMG, 2011 
 
1. Introduction 
The conciseness and readability of financial reports has long been a topic of discussion among 
preparers, regulators, and users of financial information (FASB, 2008; SEC, 2008; KPMG, 2011; 
PWC 2011). Globalization, financial innovation, and an ever increasing number of accounting 
rules and disclosure standards have given rise to more complex financial reports. Although new 
standards such as those in the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) have made financial reports more 
transparent, they have also made them more complex, thus hindering investors’ ability to extract 
relevant information.  
The objective of this study is to examine how unexpected increases in financial reporting 
complexity (or complexity shocks) affect stock return comovement, an important price 
informativeness proxy. So far, the literature has looked at complexity as a market friction that 
costs investors time and effort (Bloomfield, 2002; Li, 2008; Miller, 2010; Lee 2012). Because of 
its toll on information processing, several studies suggest that complexity shocks reduce price 
adjustment speeds (Lee, 2012; Cohen and Lou, 2012; You and Zhang, 2009). By delaying price 
adjustment, complexity shocks should increase idiosyncratic noise, reduce comovement, and 
make prices less informative. We propose that while this might be so, complexity might also 
affect comovement through a different channel. Because of its endogenous relation with 
information markets, complexity shocks might increase the demand for the private signals 
contained in low priced information, which is typically informative about multiple assets, thus 
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causing comovement to increase. The influence of complexity on comovement should be the net 
of these opposing effects. 
Traditional models have thought information markets to be exogenous to asset pricing. 
However, new theoretical work (e.g., Veldkamp, 2006; Chamley, 2007; Ganguli and Yang, 
2009; Manzano and Vives, 2011; Mele and Sangiorgi, 2015) has proposed an interplay between 
information and capital markets which could help explain the full effect of complexity on 
comovement. In these new models investors adjust to changes in their information environment 
through increases or reductions in their demand for information. In this way investors help 
determine the equilibrium price and informativeness of the signals they later use to make 
investment decisions. Alti, Kaniel and Yoeli (2012) provide evidence of this interplay. They 
show that investors respond to the uncertainty on the precision of an information signal by 
waiting for other confirming news before establishing stock positions. 
Given the relative inflexibility of information supply, which is determined by the size of the 
financial sector, short-run changes in the price and informativeness of signals are mostly 
demand-driven. A signal is more or less valuable (i.e. useful to identify mispricings) depending 
on the privacy of its content. Private information on a signal depends on the number of investors 
that gain access to it. High priced signals are only accessible to a few investors without budget 
constraints, which makes their content private and more useful, but out of the reach of most 
investors for budgetary reasons. Alternatively, low priced signals are accessible to many 
investors, which automatically make them less private and informative, but still somewhat 
useful.  
Because complexity hinders an investor’s ability to extract relevant information from a 
financial report, a complexity shock increases the value of private information from other 
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sources. Therefore, the rational response to a complexity shock should be the same response that 
a sudden drop in information production would elicit: an increase in the demand for low-priced 
signals by investors with a budget constraint, despite their limited private information content 
(Veldkamp, 2006).1 Examples of such signals are news releases issued by the firm (Barber and 
Odean, 2008 and Yuan, 2015), sector analyses, and analyst reports (De Franco, Hope, and 
Laroque, 2015; Muslu, Rebello, and Xu, 2014). We use Google search volumes to proxy for the 
demand of this type of information (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011) and the number of words in 
the 10-Q report to proxy for complexity2 (Lee, 2012). Consistent with Veldkamp’s prediction we 
find a positive relation between changes in 10-Q word counts and changes in the number of 
Google searches around the week of the 10-Q filing (i.e. searches after the filing minus searches 
before the filing), even after accounting for a positive trend in search volumes. The larger the 
magnitude of the complexity shock, the larger the increase in internet searches after the filing. 
The high demand for low-priced signals is a consequence of their value to many investors, as 
these can be used to price not just one, but multiple assets3. According to Veldkamp (2006), an 
increase in the demand for low-priced signals in information markets has an effect on capital 
1 Veldkamp (2006) addresses the fact that her model appears contradictory to the idea that investors might gravitate 
towards high priced signals that other investors are not purchasing. However, she shows that in an information 
market where investors have budgetary constraints, investors will naturally gravitate towards low priced signals 
useful for pricing multiple assets. Thus, our results depend on at least some investors having a budgetary constraint, 
which we believe is a realistic assumption. 
2 Although the Fog Index (a readability measure) has historically been the primary measure of financial reporting 
complexity, we rely on file length because it is consistent with recent literature (Lee, 2012; and Loughran and 
McDonald, 2014.)  The Fog Index uses average sentence length and proportion of complex words as readability 
proxies. However, Loughran and McDonald (2014) point out that because of the particularities of business writing, 
the complex words component of the Fog Index does not appropriately capture readability in this setting. The 
authors compare document length to alternative measures to find that document length and size yield consistent 
results with considerably less measurement error. 
3 The relation between demand and equilibrium price of information signals is a consequence of the nature of 
information. Information is different from physical goods in two ways. First it is non-rival, which means that its use 
does not preclude others from also using it. Second, it has high fixed costs but it is cheap to replicate. As a result, 
information producers respond to demand surges by replicating the signal as many times as necessary to meet the 
demand while charging a lower per-unit price (Veldkamp, 2006, 2011). 
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markets by generating excess comovement. This happens because part of the return covariance 
on stocks does not come from having synchronized cash flows, but from being priced using the 
same signals. Therefore, a complexity shock should ultimately increase the covariance between 
the stock experiencing the shock and other stocks priced using the same low-price information. 
Results from our empirical tests support this conjecture. 
Throughout our empirical analysis we center our attention on groups of peer stocks4 as a way 
of identifying stocks priced with the same signals. Consistent with our hypothesis, increases in 
10-Q word counts are followed by significant increases in the R2s from the regression of a firm's 
returns on its four closest peers. The effect of the complexity shock on peer comovement is 
statistically and economically significant. All else being equal, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in 10-Q word count, results in 5% higher R2s with peer returns in the three months following the 
report's release. 
We designed our empirical tests with the purpose of isolating the effect of complexity shocks 
on comovement from changes caused by other contemporaneous changes in information supply, 
increases in cash flow correlations, and other market frictions5. In additional analysis, we test the 
robustness of our main results to potential selection bias driven by our peer identification method 
and alternative ways of measuring complexity shocks, and also find results that support our 
prediction.  
4 Peer stocks are those stocks from peer companies, or the companies used by sell-side analysts to determine the 
value of the stocks they cover. We identify peers following Bhojraj and Lee (2002) who rely on similar "warranted 
multiples". Warranted multiples are one-year-ahead predicted enterprise value to sales ratios conditional on various 
firm and industry measures. 
5 We use fixed-effects to account for omitted variables such as joint cash flow shocks (Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Wurgler, 2005), joint under reaction to firm-specific news (including earnings announcements as in Lee, 2012), joint 
changes in the complexity of the peers’ business environment, changes in industry-specific accounting standards, 
and secular increases in the number of accounting and disclosure rules.  
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Although the results from our regressions suggest that complexity shocks are a source of 
excess comovement, this effect may be short lived, lasting only until the financial sector 
increases its production of private information to meet the higher demand. However, in a market 
with large and frequent complexity shocks, these could contribute to market-level inefficiencies 
and resource misallocation (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, 
Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004). For example, Hoberg and 
Phillips (2012) find that firms with unique products and business practices comove less with 
their peers. In this way, low peer correlations could be instrumental in identifying business 
innovators. In the presence of large and frequent complexity shocks, peer correlations might lose 
their efficacy as stock-picking tools. 
Our study sheds new light on the interplay between capital and information markets. To the 
best of our knowledge we are the first to examine the role of complexity shocks on comovement, 
complementing what has already been done for opacity, another aspect of the firm’s information 
environment (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009).6 In the case of 
opacity (which is the opposite of transparency), comovement arises not because of surges in 
information demand but because of information asymmetries between managers and investors. 
With opaque information, investors see some of the firms' cash flow changes, but not all. This 
makes prices respond only to those firm-specific signals that can be seen, resulting in lower firm-
specific volatility and higher comovement. Complexity is different from opacity as it does not 
impair market participants from seeing all signals. An information environment can be fully 
transparent yet complex if all signals are visible but investors cannot understand them. In such 
6 We note that a recent study by Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh (2014) calls into question the robustness of the 
findings in Hutton et al. (2009), which furthers the need for additional work in this area. 
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cases investors will deal with complexity by acquiring low cost information. In the end, both 
complexity and opacity are sources of excess comovement.  
 
2. How complexity shocks influence a firm’s information environment 
Information choice theory predicts that investors respond to complexity shocks by increasing 
their demand for low-price information, which ultimately increases excess comovement. 
However, a positive relation between current complexity changes and future comovement does 
not necessarily imply that investors are purchasing low-priced information in response to 
complexity shocks. Therefore, to truly test the theory, we need a direct test between changes in 
information complexity and subsequent changes in information demand.  
There are many examples of low-priced signals that we could use for this analysis such as 
news releases issued by the firm, news and headlines from the popular press (Barber and Odean, 
2008 and Yuan, 2015), sector analyses, and sell-side analyst reports (De Franco et al., 2015; 
Muslu et al., 2014). However, the fact that these reports are being produced by the financial 
sector does not guarantee that they are being requested and used by investors. Instead of relying 
on one or a combination of these signals, we use aggregate search frequency from Google (Da et 
al., 2011) to directly capture low-price information demand. We choose this measure for three 
reasons. First, investors nowadays use a search engine to look for information signals, and 
Google continues to be the most frequently used search engine. According to Net Marketshare, 
as of July of 2014, Google was the world's most popular search engine, with 68.75% of all 
searches worldwide7. Second, search is a revealed attention measure, what stocks investors are 
searching for in Google are without a doubt the stocks investors are demanding information for. 
7 Source: Net Marketshare (http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/google-baidu-are-the-worlds-most-popular-search-
engines/ last accessed on November 23rd, 2015.) 
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Third, it is very inexpensive to use a search engine to find information signals and many of these 
signals are available at no cost. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that internet searches capture 
the demand for low-priced information. 
We extract data from two Google products: Google Trends and Google AdWords and use it to 
build a sample of internet search volumes in weekly frequencies8. There are 32,753 observations 
in this sample with matching 10-Q filings available in machine-readable format covering the 
period 2004-2009. To test the relation between changes in financial statement complexity and 
changes in internet search volume, we examine the period 12 weeks before and 12 weeks after 
the 10-Q filing. Even though we use a relatively short window, we note that increases in search 
volume throughout time could influence our analysis. Therefore, we utilize the methodology in 
Baum (2006) to detrend the pre and post filing series’ by estimating a regression with a count 
variable for time as the independent variable. In our tabulated analysis, we use the residuals from 
this estimation process to form a time independent series, and following Baum (2006) we add the 
mean of the series to the residuals to “rebench” the data for easier interpretation.9  
Each quarter, we sort observations into quartiles according to changes in 10-Q word counts, 
our proxy for the magnitude of the complexity shock. The construction and statistical properties 
of this variable are described at length in section 3.3. Panel A in Table 1 presents the average of 
8 Data to construct the Google search volume database was downloaded from Google Trends and Google AdWords 
during the first three weeks in May of 2013. The dataset contains search volumes on the Google Search engine for 
ticker symbols of all publicly traded companies in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. We use the data extracted 
through these tools to produce a historical series of Google search volumes since the first week in January of 2004, 
the first month of data availability. For each ticker symbol in the WRDS monthly stock return file we extract the 
average Google monthly search volume for the past 12 months from Google Ad Words and convert it to a weekly 
frequency. We then determine the search volumes for the past 12 months. Google Trends does not give a historical 
times series of absolute search volumes, but an index where 100 indicates the week in which the search term reached 
its highest level. To convert the search volume indices to absolute numbers we calculate the average weekly search 
volume by multiplying the weekly index times the average weekly volume over the past 12 months. To calculate 
search volumes since January of 2004, which are on a different basis as those for the past 12 months, we use the 
conversion: (weekly index*Search volume in first week of most recent 12 month period)/Search index in first week 
of most recent 12 month period. Finally, we connect the search volumes since January 2004 with search volumes 
over the past 12 month period to obtain the complete series.  
9 We find qualitatively similar results using raw data, rather than de-trended data. 
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total internet searches (de-trended) on a firm’s ticker symbol during the 12 weeks before and 12 
weeks after the week of its 10-Q filing (excluding the filing week). We find an increase in the 
number of internet searches on a stock’s ticker symbol during the 12 weeks following the week 
of a firm’s 10-Q release for all levels of complexity shocks during our sample period, however 
the differences are statistically significant only in the two largest quartiles of changes in financial 
reporting complexity, consistent with our expectations. The change in search volumes ranges 
between 1,481 and 6,222 searches. Furthermore, consistent with our hypothesis, search volume 
changes following 10-Q releases are proportional to the size of the complexity shock. The larger 
the shock, the larger the change in the number of internet searches. Panel B in Table 1presents 
the average difference in mean weekly ticker searches in the 12 weeks before and after the filing. 
Consistent with Panel A, Panel B reports that the highest average change in search volume 
occurs in the highest quartile of changes in financial reporting complexity, and the lowest 
average change occurs in the lowest quartile. A t-test of the difference in this variable between 
the top and bottom quartiles shows this difference is statistically different from zero (t-stat =2.27; 
p-value=0.02.) 
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Table 1 
Influence of Financial Reporting Complexity Shocks on Internet Search Volumes 
Panel A presents the average of de-trended total internet search volume on a firm’s ticker symbol during the 12 weeks before and 12 
weeks after the week of its 10-Q filing. The total number of firm-quarters in the sample is 32,753 covering the period 2004-2009. The 
number of weekly internet searches is obtained from Google Trends and Google AdWords. Stocks are sorted into quartiles according 
to the change in 10-Q length, a proxy for financial reporting complexity. Panel B presents the average difference in mean weekly de-
trended ticker searches in the 12 weeks around the 10-Q filing.  
 
Panel A: Relation between change in 10-Q length and average de-trended total search volumes before and after the 10-Q release 
 
 Change in 10Q Length (Quartile) 
 
All Firms Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Average internet searches before 10-Q release  515,381   534,466   491,388   511,391   524,278  
Average internet searches after 10-Q release  518,800   535,947   493,163   515,590   530,500  
Difference  3,419   1,481   1,775   4,199   6,222  
Percent change 0.66% 0.28% 0.36% 0.82% 1.19% 
p-value for difference 0.00 0.38 0.28 0.03 0.00 
 
Panel B: Relation between change in 10-Q length and average change in mean weekly de-trended search volume 
 
 Change in 10Q Length (Quartile) 
 
 
All Firms Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 𝑄𝑄4 − 𝑄𝑄1����������� t(Q4-Q1) PHo:Q4-Q1=0 
Avg. change in mean weekly de-trended 
internet searches 
168  30.7   218.3   131.9   290.4   259.7  2.27 0.02 
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Overall, the numbers presented in Table 1 are consistent with an increase in low-price 
information demand following a complexity shock and with an information-choice explanation 
for the positive relation between complexity shocks and comovement. This relation will be tested 
and measured statistically in subsequent sections. 
 
3. Measuring the influence of complexity shocks on comovement 
3.1 Sample construction 
The starting point of this sample is the intersection of Compustat and CRSP with 10-Q filings 
available in machine-readable format.10 Analyst forecast data are retrieved from IBES, under the 
assumption that missing IBES data implies no analyst coverage for that period. Data on 
institutional ownership are obtained from the SEC's 13f reports available in the Thomson 
Financial's Institutional Holdings data set. Table 2 outlines the sample construction procedures. 
We begin by identifying peer groups following the methodology in Bhojraj and Lee (2002). Data 
requirements to perform the warranted multiple calculations are highly restrictive. From the 
176,336 firm-years with available data in Compustat and CRSP, only 55,949 have the necessary 
data to calculate warranted multiples. Further, after limiting the sample to firms and peers with at 
least two consecutive 10-Qs with necessary stock return data (29,250 firm-quarters), and firms 
with available data for all treatment and control variables we obtain a final sample of 26,484 
firm-quarters during the period 1995 through 2009.11  
10 We utilize the Python programming language to gather 10-Q documents and tabulate lexical properties. We first 
convert all filings to plain text, thus allowing us to include both HTML and plain text quarterly filings in our 
analysis. 
11 When assigning peer groups we do not impose restrictions on the potential peers based on data necessary in later 
analysis. This is to ensure we find the most valid peer group, and not just the set of peers conditional on data 
availability. We lose a substantial number of observations (53,942 firm-quarters) based on all members of a firm’s 
peer group not having two consecutive 10-Qs in the period to calculate average peer group complexity, used as a 
control in our analysis. To make sure that our regression coefficients are representative of the universe and not 
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Table 2  
Sample construction 
  Observations Subtracted Sub-total 
. 
  Warranted Multiples Calculation 
  . 
  Firm-years on Compustat between 1995-2009 with prior 
year data availability 
 
176,336 
Less:  REITS and ADRs    (9,361) 166,975 
Less: Firms with prices<$3  (40,232) 126,743  
Less: Firms with negative equity    (7,610) 119,133  
Less: Missing necessary data for warranted multiple 
calculation  (58,632)    60,501  
Less: Trimming at 1 and 99% by year    (4,254)    56,247  
Less: Industries with less than 5 members       (298)    55,949  
Total Firm-years with Warranted Multiple    55,949  
 Less: Firms with less than 10 potential peers    (5,398)    50,551  
Total firm-years with 4 peers identified    50,551    
   
Total firm-quarters with 10-Q length, from the 50,551 firm-
years 101,025 
   
 Final Sample Selection 
    Less: Firm-quarters missing necessary returns data 
surrounding the 10-Q filing for the firm and it's complete 
assigned peer group 
(17,833) 83,192 
Less: Firm-quarters without all four peers having 10-Q 
length data 
Less: Firm-quarters without necessary data to construct 
control variables 
   (53,942) 
 
(2,766) 
   29,250 
 
26,484  
Total number of firm-quarters used in analysis    26,484  
  
 
unique to the smaller sample, we relax the data requirements to calculate average peer complexity only for sets with 
at least 3 of the 4 peers having complexity data, as well as completely unrestricting that requirement. Results from 
these regressions are qualitatively the same as those presented.  
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Table 3 presents our sample's distribution across years and industry groups. For the sake of 
comparison, we present the distribution of the total number of firm-quarters in the 
CRSP/Compustat universe in a separate column. We observe that the distribution of observations 
in our sample across years and industries closely resemble the distribution in the 
CRSP/Compustat universe and do not detect substantial concentration of data points in any 
particular year or industry. Panel A shows the distribution of firm-quarters by fiscal year. The 
sample begins in 1995, which is the first year with significant machine-readable quarterly SEC 
filings. The smallest number of observations occurs on that first year of the series (82 firm-
quarters, 0.31% of the sample) while the largest occurs in 1997 (3,016 firm-quarters, 11.39% of 
the sample). Panel B shows the sample distribution by industry. We sort firm-quarters according 
to the Fama and French 30 industry portfolios.12 In general, the sample appears to have 
reasonable coverage across many industries. However, there is a slight overrepresentation 
towards firms in Personal and Business Services (4,319 firm quarters, 16.31% of the sample), 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Pharmaceuticals (3,931 firm-quarters, 14.84% of the 
sample), and Business Equipment (3,940 firm-quarters, 14.88% of the sample), and 
underrepresentation of Banking, Insurance, Real Estate and Trading (749 firm-quarters, 2.83% of 
the sample), and no representation in Tobacco Products and Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and 
Metal Mining.  
Table 3 also shows the average 10-Q word counts for firms in our sample broken down by 
year and by industry group. We observe a sustained increase in the number of words in the 10-Q 
statements over the years. At the onset of the sample period, in 1995 the average 10-Q had 8,184 
words. At the end of the series, in 2009, this number had risen to 19,787 words. In other words, 
12 The 30 industry portfolios are available at Kenneth R. French's data library 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html, last accessed January 28, 2013). 
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the average 10-Q more than doubled its length in those 14 years. We use year fixed-effects to 
control for the positive trend in average 10-Q length in our regressions. We also find some 
distinguishable patterns in 10-Q word counts across industries. Two industries in particular, Coal 
and Utilities have abnormally long 10-Qs with 24,625 and 25,048 words, respectively. Industries 
with relatively short 10-Qs are Textiles (8,168 words), Automobiles and Trucks (9,568 words) 
and Apparel (9,650 words). We use industry fixed-effects in our regressions to control for the 
differences in 10-Q word counts across industries. 
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Table 3 
Sample distribution 
This table presents information about the distribution of 10-Q lengths across time and industry. 
Industry classifications are the 30 industry groups in Fama and French (1997). 
 
  
  
Average 10-Q 
Word Count 
Sample  
Distribution 
CRSP/Compustat 
 Distribution 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Fiscal Year 
1995  8,184   82  0.31 33,794  6.89 
1996  9,646   1,288  4.86 35,767  7.29 
1997  9,968   3,016  11.39 36,108  7.36 
1998  11,092   2,815  10.63 36,031  7.35 
1999  12,243   2,451  9.25 36,796  7.50 
2000  9,252   1,618  6.11 36,614  7.47 
2001  8,279   1,216  4.59 34,521  7.04 
2002  11,233   1,601  6.05 32,685  6.67 
2003  13,843   2,458  9.28 31,147  6.35 
2004  14,432   1,552  5.86 32,501  6.63 
2005  15,668   1,456  5.50 31,105  6.34 
2006  18,847   1,476  5.57 29,903  6.10 
2007  17,247   1,806  6.82 28,938  5.90 
2008  18,987   2,479  9.36 27,733  5.66 
2009  19,787   1,170  4.42 26,676  5.44 
Total  13,247   26,484  100.0 490,319  100.0 
 
 
    Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
Food Products 10,925 483 1.82 9,462 1.93 
Beer & Liquor  10,417  112 0.42 1,528 0.31 
Tobacco Products N/A 0 0.00 512 0.10 
Recreation  14,510  625 2.36 12,628 2.58 
Printing and Publishing  11,790  440 1.66 4,954 1.01 
Consumer Goods  10,983  468 1.77 6,993 1.43 
Apparel  9,650  288 1.09 5,528 1.13 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceuticals  13,569  3,931 14.84 49,185 10.03 
Chemicals  13,444  807 3.05 8,103 1.65 
Textiles  8,168  48 0.18 1,910 0.39 
Construction and Construction Materials  10,561  830 3.13 12,566 2.56 
Steel Works Etc.  12,677  447 1.69 6,021 1.23 
Fabricated Products and Machinery  10,666  1,327 5.01 15,401 3.14 
Electrical Equipment  9,944  431 1.63 6,327 1.29 
Automobiles and Trucks  9,568  407 1.54 6,159 1.26 
Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment  11,237  220 0.83 2,609 0.53 
Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and Metal Mining N/A 0 0.00 10,867 2.22 
Coal  24,625  16 0.06 748 0.15 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  14,993  1,533 5.79 20,712 4.22 
Utilities  25,048  684 2.58 15,826 3.23 
Communication  18,416  577 2.18 18,047 3.68 
Personal and Business Services  14,931  4,319 16.31 62,954 12.84 
Business Equipment  13,284  3,940 14.88 55,685 11.36 
Business Supplies and Shipping Containers  10,953  377 1.42 6,514 1.33 
Transportation  11,579  764 2.88 11,758 2.40 
Wholesale  11,986  1,179 4.45 16,677 3.40 
Retail  12,758  637 2.41 20,501 4.18 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels  13,392  231 0.87 8,815 1.80 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading  13,212  749 2.83 76,179 15.54 
Everything Else  11,743  614 2.32 15,150 3.09 
Total  13,037   26,484  100.0    490,319  100.0 
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3.2 Peer group formation  
We hypothesize that unanticipated shocks to financial reporting complexity make firm 
returns more strongly correlated with those of its peers. We identify a firm’s peer group 
following the method in Bhojraj and Lee (2002), which identifies peers according to their 
predicted enterprise value to sales ratios, also known as their warranted multiples. Warranted 
multiples are calculated by fitting annual cross-sectional regressions of enterprise value to sales 
on eight explanatory variables.13 Coefficients from these regressions are used to estimate the 
one-year-ahead predicted enterprise value to sales.14 A firm’s peer group consists of the four 
industry peers with the closest warranted multiples. Because this process uses annual data, we 
assume that the peer groups remain effective for all quarters during the fiscal year. 
Although we follow Bhojraj and Lee (2002) as closely as we can, our experimental design 
requires that we make four modifications to their method: 
1) We require that a CRSP permno be available for all stocks at the start of the sample selection 
process.15  
2) Given that peer comparisons do not require that peer firms have an analyst following, we 
replace the analyst-generated growth forecasts in the Bhojraj and Lee (2002) model with 
realized sales growth over the previous year.  
3) We relax the minimum sales requirement of $100 million. Although relaxing this restriction 
should help incorporate smaller firms into the sample, the sample remains somewhat skewed 
towards larger firms because of other extensive data requirements.  
13 These variables are: average price-to-book ratio for the firm’s industry; industry-adjusted profit margin; a variable 
that captures the differential effect of profit margin on the price-to-sales ratio of loss firms; industry-adjusted growth 
forecasts; book-value leverage ratio; return on net operating assets; return on equity; and research and development 
to sales ratio. See Bhojraj and Lee (2002) for a detailed description of the estimation process.  
14 The coefficient estimates we obtain from regressing warranted multiples on their determinants are similar to those 
in Bhojraj and Lee (2002) (untabulated). 
15 We do not require that returns data be available at this stage to obtain the closest possible matches.  
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4) To ensure that peer groups are not merely a function of the remaining firms in a given 
industry, we require that at least 10 potential peers be available in each industry before 
selecting the four closest matches.  
 
3.3 Measurement of financial reporting complexity shocks  
We use quarterly changes in 10-Q lengths to proxy for the size of the complexity shock 
faced by economic agents when attempting to extract relevant information from a new 10-Q 
report (Lee, 2012; Brown and Tucker, 2011).16,17 Prior research has primarily relied on two 
readability measures to proxy for financial reporting complexity: the length of SEC filings and 
the Gunning Fog Index (Li, 2008; You and Zhang, 2009; Miller, 2010; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, 
2011; Lee, 2012). Loughran and McDonald (2014) find that the Fog Index is poorly specified 
when used to evaluate financial texts, and recommend document length as an alternative. We 
utilize the number of words in the SEC 10-Q filings as our primary complexity measure to allow 
for comparability with Lee (2012).18 We gather all 10-Q filings from Direct Edgar for the years 
1995-2009 using the Python programming language, and count the number of words contained in 
each file. We believe that changes in 10-Q word counts (as opposed to levels) are a better proxy 
16 We utilize quarterly data in our analysis to maximize the power of our tests, because we believe this is the most 
likely reporting window where increases in length will be unexpected to analysts. Lee (2012) finds that the 
information processing costs associated with increases in 10-Q complexity are associated with market under-
reaction. This is consistent with complexity affecting investors at quarterly and not just annual intervals, as 
expected. We examine changes in an annual reporting window in section 5.2. 
17 We test the robustness of our results to an alternative complexity shock definition. In particular we consider 
whether investors experience a shock only when the change in 10-Q length exceeds the change of other stocks in the 
industry. We redo our main analysis using the difference in industry-quarter mean adjusted 10-Q word counts as our 
primary independent variable of interest. Results from this additional test are similar to those presented in Table 6.  
18 In the final version of Loughran and McDonald (2014) the authors recommend using the 10-K complete 
submission file size as a measure for reporting complexity because it is exceptionally easy to determine, not 
necessarily due to superior performance relative to the number of words in the SEC submission document. In 
previous, unpublished versions of their study, the recommended proxy was the number of words in the SEC 
submission document. We report the results from word counts, so the economic interpretation of our results would 
remain consistent with that in Lee (2012). Results obtained using 10-Q file size as the complexity proxy instead of 
10-Q word count are similar to those presented in Table 6. 
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of unanticipated shocks on financial reporting complexity, which is the treatment variable in our 
hypothesis.19 Table 4 reports the average 10-Q in the sample has 13,436 words (10,487 for the 
median). 10-Q word counts range between 2,278 and 62,862 words. Average and median word 
counts for stocks in our sample are slightly lower, yet comparable, to those in Lee (2012), who 
report median 10-Q counts of 14,499 words. COMPLEXit is the natural logarithm of the number 
of words in the 10-Q. ΔCOMPLEXit is the change in COMPLEXit between previous and current 
quarters and is the measure of financial reporting complexity used throughout our analysis. The 
average quarterly 10-Q change in the sample is 452 (490 for the median) words (untabulated). 
Table 4 includes descriptive statistics on our variables of interest. Compared to the average 
COMPLEXit of 9.253, the average mean ΔCOMPLEXit of 0.044 seems very small and suggests 
stickiness in 10-Q filings from one quarter to the next. However, the standard deviation of 0.57, 
which corresponds to a standard deviation in 10-Q changes of 10,061 words (untabulated), 
indicates substantial variation in this variable. 
  
19 Because 10-Qs are only produced in the first through third quarters of the fiscal year we measure the first quarter 
change as the first quarter length minus the third quarter length in the prior year. 
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Table 4 
Sample statistics for variables used to determine the influence of complexity on peer stock comovement 
This table reports sample statistics for the variables used in our analysis. We report number of observations (N), mean, standard 
deviation, and key points in the distribution. ΔSYNCHit is the change in peer group synchronicity around the filing date of the 10-Q, 
where synchronicity is measured as a log transformation of the R2 from a regression of firm returns on value-weighted peer group 
returns. ΔCOMPLEXit is the change from last quarter of the natural logarithm of the number of words in the 10-Q report. All other 
variables are described in detail in the Appendix. 
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Variable N Mean Standard Dev. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
R2  26,484  0.106 0.143 0.000 0.009 0.045 0.144 0.642 
SYNCHit  26,484  -3.420 2.385 -11.320 -4.680 -3.063 -1.738 0.627 
ΔSYNCHit  26,484  0.028 2.526 -7.547 -1.228 0.031 1.312 7.475 
RAW_WORDSit  26,484   13,436   10,487   2,278   6,073   10,600   17,452   62,862  
COMPLEXit  26,484  9.253 0.711 7.731 8.712 9.269 9.767 11.050 
ΔCOMPLEXit  26,484  0.044 0.565 -2.168 -0.087 0.054 0.186 2.255 
AVG_PR_COMPLEXit   26,484  9.249 0.510 7.967 8.872 9.288 9.638 10.360 
ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit  26,484  0.043 0.323 -1.191 -0.118 0.055 0.192 1.278 
QSIZEit  26,484  5.942 1.866 2.147 4.581 5.837 7.178 10.860 
ΔQSIZEit  26,484  0.016 0.317 -0.958 -0.145 0.020 0.184 0.978 
MKT_SHAREit  26,484  0.074 0.157 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.062 0.896 
ΔMKT_SHAREit  26,484  0.000 0.019 -0.093 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.103 
ANALYSTSit  26,484  1.395 0.946 0.000 0.693 1.386 2.079 3.258 
ΔANALYSTSit  26,484  0.028 0.253 -0.693 0.000 0.000 0.095 1.099 
INSTPERCit  26,484  0.330 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.265 0.590 1.000 
ΔINSTPERCit  26,484  0.010 0.058 -0.154 -0.004 0.000 0.019 0.299 
QBTMit  26,484  -0.874 0.732 -2.921 -1.322 -0.820 -0.370 0.735 
ΔQBTMit  26,484  0.024 0.323 -0.918 -0.146 0.013 0.182 1.094 
ROEit  26,484  0.014 0.071 -0.334 0.002 0.024 0.044 0.208 
ΔROEit  26,484  -0.001 0.069 -0.343 -0.014 0.000 0.012 0.342 
LEVERAGEit  26,484  0.438 0.211 0.054 0.262 0.442 0.603 0.895 
ΔLEVERAGEit  26,484  0.001 0.052 -0.249 -0.018 -0.002 0.017 0.209 
DED_IOERCit  26,484  0.042 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.339 
ΔDED_IOPERCit  26,484  -0.001 0.030 -0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.112 
INFOit  26,484  0.165 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OPACITYit  26,484  0.002 0.039 -0.125 -0.017 0.001 0.020 0.138 
ΔOPACITYit  26,484  0.039 0.043 0.000 0.011 0.024 0.050 0.240 
NOISEit  26,484  0.058 0.167 -0.320 -0.057 0.051 0.165 0.489 
ΔNOISEit  26,484  -0.001 0.198 -0.480 -0.132 0.000 0.132 0.474 
TURNOVERit  26,484  1.528 1.627 0.033 0.443 0.999 1.998 8.953 
ΔTURNOVERit  26,484  0.029 1.174 -4.295 -0.330 0.001 0.352 4.750 
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ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit   is the quarterly change in AVG_PR_COMPLEXit, or the average 10-
Q word counts of the firm’s four closest peers. Summary statistics of average peer 10-Q word 
counts are almost identical to those for COMPLEXit and ΔCOMPLEXit. This is to be expected 
given that the firms under study and their matching peers are drawn from the same sample. We 
include ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit   in our regressions to account for the changes in R2 caused by 
changes in peer complexity. Consistent with information choice theory, increases in peer 10-Q 
word counts should increase the demand for low-cost information, resulting in a positive relation 
between changes in average peer 10-Q word counts and changes in peer stock comovement.  
 
3.4 Measurement of peer group comovement  
The dependent variable in our tests is the change in the correlation between a stock's 
returns and those of its four closest peers before and after the 10-Q filing. Based on our 
hypothesis, we expect that word count increases will be followed by increases in return 
comovement among peer stocks. Following prior literature (Morck et al., 2000; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006; and Crawford, Roulstone, and So, 2012; among 
others), we denote peer comovement as SYNCHit, which is short for synchronicity.20 We measure 
peer comovement changes by the difference between the R2 of a stock's returns with the value-
weighted average return of its four closest peers during the three months prior to the 10-Q filing 
and the three months following the 10-Q filing, excluding the month of the filing in both periods. 
Our measure is similar to Crawford et al. (2012); however, instead of looking at the R2 of the 
20 The accounting and finance literatures have used several terms to describe the movement of stock prices in the 
same direction. The most commonly used terms are synchronicity, comovement, firm-specific return variation (to 
denote the portion of returns that do not co-vary), or simply R2 (e.g., Roll, 1988; Jin and Myers, 2006). The term 
synchronicity is a relatively newer term, it was first used in Morck et al. (2000) to identify co-variation measured as 
the proportion of stock prices moving in the same direction in a given country.  
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regression of stock returns on the market portfolio’s, we look at the R2 of the regression of stock 
returns on its four closest peers’, as shown in equation (1): 
RETURNit = γ0 + γ1PEER_RETURNit + εit                      (1) 
RETURNit is the daily return of firm i on day t. PEER_RETURNit is the value-weighted average 
daily return of the firm’s four closest peers on day t. We fit this regression on each period before 
and after the 10-Q filing with a minimum of 50 daily observations. The R2 from this regression 
captures the amount of peer information incorporated into the stock's returns and the extent to 
which stock prices move together. The R2 for the average firm-quarter is 0.11 (median of 0.045) 
and the measure ranges between near zero (1.25x10-5) and 0.64. We apply a log-transformation 
to limit the influence of outliers and unbind the statistic, creating a closer approximation to the 
normal distribution. Specifically, we use the transformation: 
SYNCHit = ln(R2/(1-R2))                                       (2) 
R2 is the coefficient of determination from equation (1). Intuitively, SYNCHit measures the 
degree to which firm-level stock returns are explained by peer group returns. Since we estimate 
SYNCHit for the three months before and the three months after the filing date, ΔSYNCHit is the 
change in peer group synchronicity around the 10-Q filing.  
 
3.5 Control variables 
To isolate the effect of complexity shocks on peer comovement we introduce control 
variables that proxy for five factors that could influence peer comovement at the time of the 
shock:  
1) Changes in information production.  
2) Changes in transaction costs.  
22 
 
3) Joint cash flow shocks caused by simultaneous shocks to firm fundamentals. Examples of 
these shocks could be higher industrywide sales caused by aggregate income shocks, lower 
barriers to trade, increases in foreign demand, or the launching of new products.  
4) Joint underreaction to firm-specific news, including earnings announcements (Lee 2012).  
5) Trends in information supply, transaction costs, and firm fundamentals not captured by our 
control variables. 
   
3.5.1 Information Production  
Information production can be defined as all the news generated by the financial sector about 
a firm. In general, comovement declines with the production of firm-specific information and 
increases with the production of market and industry information. Firm-specific information 
reduces comovement because with more firm-specific information, the incentive to demand low-
cost signals, containing mostly industry information, declines.  
Two separate streams of literature produce opposing predictions on how (firm-specific) 
information production affects comovement. On the one hand, information choice theory, and 
Veldkamp (2006) in particular, predict that an increase in the number of information signals 
about a firm should reduce comovement. This is because a firm-specific news story, say for 
example a press release, is assumed to contain mostly firm-specific information and an increase 
in firm-specific information is expected to reduce investors’ incentives to acquire low-cost 
signals. With fewer investors relying on low-cost signals, comovement should decline. On the 
other hand, the information transfers literature assumes that a firm-specific news story has a 
considerable amount of market and industry information embedded, which can be “transferred” 
to other similar firms (Foster, 1981; Clinch and Sinclair, 1987; Han and Wild, 1990; Olsen and 
Dietrich, 1985; Baginski, 1987; and Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson, 2008; among many others). 
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For example, a positive earnings announcement for a retail firm is typically well received by all 
investors holding long positions in the retail sector because sales revenue across many retailers 
are highly positively correlated. Therefore, an increase in the production of firm-specific news 
increases comovement because with more news being generated, more information is transferred 
to other firms.  
We include firm characteristics such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, and leverage as 
information production proxies (Hutton et al., 2009). Traditionally, information supply has been 
captured by firm size, either as total market capitalization or as the book value of total assets. 
Crawford et al. (2012) explain that firm size proxies for “various dimensions of the firm’s 
information environment, including media exposure and the overall level of investor interest.” 
(p. 1536). At the same time, firm size is also related to complexity, as large firms tend to have 
more complex organizational structures (Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004), more intangibles 
on their balance sheets (Gu and Wang, 2005), and face stricter internal control reporting 
requirements than small firms (Ettredge, Johnstone, Stone, and Wang, 2011), resulting in longer 
financial reports. Other variables positively related to size, such as earnings (i.e.; return on 
equity), market share, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage are also used frequently to 
proxy for information production.  
We calculate firm size (QSIZEit) as the natural logarithm of the product of quarter-end 
closing share prices times the number of common and ordinary shares outstanding and take its 
first difference (∆QSIZEit). Although, our sample has a slight tilt towards large firms, it still 
includes substantial size variation. The average QSIZEit is 5.942 (corresponding to $381 million), 
while the variable ranges between $8.6 million and $52.1 billion. Book to market (QBTMit) is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
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equity. Leverage (LEVERAGEit) is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Average 
leverage of our sample is 0.438. 
Return on Equity (ROEit) is the firm’s earnings scaled by the book value of equity in a given 
quarter. Average quarterly ROEit is 1.4%. Quarterly changes in ROE are denoted as ΔROEit. We 
include this variable to control for the effect of performance on comovement, as in Hutton et al. 
(2009). 
Similar to firm characteristics, analyst coverage is often used to proxy for information 
production as analysts’ reports and forecasts provide information (Lys and Soo, 1995; Lang, 
Lins, and Miller, 2003). At the same time, several studies find that analysts gravitate towards 
large firms (Brennan and Hughes, 1991), firms that disclose more (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996), and firms with less readable financial reports (Lehavy et al., 2011). We 
measure the intensity of analyst coverage (ANALYSTSit) following Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) as the logarithmic transformation (ln[1+x]) of the number of earnings estimates on the 
stock in a given quarter. The mean and median number of analyst forecasts in our sample is four, 
while the range is between zero and 26. 
An additional caveat with the use of traditional information production variables in our 
regressions is that they might be positively correlated with 10-Q word counts and with one 
another. For this reason, even though we include them in our analysis for the sake of 
completeness, we refrain from conducting inference on their coefficient estimates. Instead, we 
introduce two variables uncorrelated to changes in complexity: an indicator that takes the value 
of one when a news-grabbing event coincides with the complexity shock (INFOit), and changes 
in equity ownership of dedicated financial institutions (DED_IOPERCit).  
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INFOit is our proxy for news grabbing events and is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if in the three months leading up to the quarterly filing there was an equity issuance, a 
debt issuance, a stock split, or a special dividend. If none of these events took place during the 
three months before the filing, INFOit takes a value of zero. Stock splits and special dividends 
are obtained directly from the CRSP events file. Equity issuances are detected through changes 
in the number of shares issued. Debt issuances are approximated by the 10% largest long term 
debt increases experienced by firms during the sample period.  
Dedicated institutional ownership (DED_IOPERCit) is measured as the percentage of the 
firm’s shares owned by dedicated financial institutions. According to Bushee and Noe (2000) 
and Bushee (2001), dedicated financial institutions are those that invest in long-term, stable firms 
and seek longer-term dividend income and capital appreciation. These institutions are 
characterized by large portfolio allocations, low turnovers, and relationship investing. Because of 
their high levels of specialization, dedicated institutions are expected to trade on private 
information more often than other financial institutions, particularly index funds. Therefore, we 
expect that price fluctuations from stocks owned more heavily by dedicated institutions will 
reveal more firm-specific information than those from stocks owned by other types of 
institutional investors. We obtain quarterly institutional ownership data from the Thomson 
Financial 13(f) database as of the end of each fiscal quarter. ∆DED_IOPERCit is the change in 
dedicated institutional ownership between the quarter before and the quarter of the filing. 
Average dedicated institutional ownership in our sample is 4.2% (median of 0%) and ranges 
between 0% and 33.9%. 
Another control variable to account for the effect of the information environment on peer 
correlations is opacity. As explained in the introduction, opacity and complexity are separate 
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attributes of information that should produce higher comovement. The theoretical model in Jin 
and Myers (2006) explains that opacity provides corporate insiders with opportunities to extract 
private control benefits and suppress the release of firm-specific information. The lack of firm-
specific information causes stocks to correlate. We follow Hutton et al. (2009) and use 
discretionary accruals to capture opacity (OPACITYit), where discretionary accruals are defined 
as the residuals from a performance controlled Jones (1991) regression as outlined in Kothari, 
Leone, and Wasley (2005). As expected, average (median) OPACITYit in the sample is near zero, 
at 0.2% (0.1%) of total assets, and there is significant variation with a range between -12.5% and 
13.8% of total assets. ΔOPACITYit is the quarterly change in OPACITYit  
In addition to capturing increases in media attention as firms increase their sales revenue and 
net income at the expense of other firms in their industry, thus reducing comovement, changes in 
market share and earnings may also account for intra-industry information transfers between 
firms experiencing positive performance and other firms in the same industry (Foster, 1981). As 
a firm becomes dominant in an industry, more investors will use its news as industry 
information, thus increasing comovement (Hou, 2007). We calculate market share 
(MKT_SHAREit) as the percentage of firm sales on total industry sales in a given quarter, where 
industry is defined as all firms with the same four-digit SIC code. While most of the sample 
firms control a small portion of their markets, several of them could be dominant enough to be 
considered bellwether firms. The average (median) market share is 7.4% (1.2%), while the 
variable ranges between near zero and 89.6%. Quarterly market share change is denoted as 
∆MKT_SHAREit.  
For completeness, our regressions also include institutional ownership of non-dedicated 
financial institutions (INSTPERCit). These financial institutions are less likely to trade on firm-
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specific information because they follow either indices or speculative strategies. Analogous to 
the calculation for DED_IOPERCit, we measure INSTPERCit as the proportion of shares held by 
non-dedicated financial institutions to total shares outstanding, again following Bushee (2001). 
Mean and median INSTPERCit is 33% and 26.5%, respectively. Our sample contains stocks with 
a full range of institutional ownerships, from zero to 100%.  
 
3.5.2 Transaction Costs  
In general, an increase in transaction costs increases investors’ underreaction to firm-specific 
news and reduces comovement. This happens because transaction costs delay the occurrence of 
profitable trades by arbitrageurs that trade on new information. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
and Damodaran (1993) posit that stock prices adjust to news at different speeds because not all 
investors receive information signals at the same time, so the trades from late-informed investors 
lag behind the trades from early-informed investors (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; 
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994). Market frictions exacerbate differences in 
information arrival and trade executions between early and late-informed investors, delaying 
price adjustment. Hence, correlations across stock returns should increase as cross-sectional 
differences in information arrival and trade execution subside. We expect a negative relation 
between peer comovement and market frictions. We utilize two market frictions proxies, the 
first-order autocorrelation coefficient of stocks returns and share turnover. 
According to Black (1986) the noise component of price fluctuations (NOISEit) has a 
temporary effect on prices. Given the temporary nature of noise, we expect it to contribute to the 
negative autocorrelation of returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987). We measure noise (NOISEit) 
following Amihud and Mendelson (1987) as the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of daily 
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returns of stock i during quarter t. We multiply NOISEit times minus one for ease of 
interpretation; this way, we obtain a measure that increases when noise increases and declines 
when noise declines. We compute the change in NOISEit between the three month period before 
the 10-Q filing month and the three month period after the 10-Q filing month. To remain 
consistent with the measurement of return synchronicity (∆SYNCHit), we exclude the 10-Q filing 
month from both estimation periods. We denote the change in noise around the 10-Q filing 
month as ∆NOISEit.  
In addition to including noise as an aggregate market frictions measure, we include stock 
turnover (TURNOVERit), a measure of transaction costs. TURNOVERit is measured as dollar 
volume divided by number of shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. We calculate turnover 
change (∆TURNOVERit) between the three month period before the 10-Q filing month and the 
three month period after the 10-Q filing month.  
 
3.5.3 Other correlated effects 
Joint changes in firm fundamentals (3) and joint underreaction to firm-specific news (4) are 
controlled for by using industry indicator variables. We also note that the use of industry 
indicators would eliminate the effect of joint increases in complexity caused by changes in 
industry-specific accounting rules and disclosure standards. This means that the coefficients of 
our treatment variables might understate the total effect of complexity shocks on 
complementarities. Similarly, trends in information production, transaction costs and firm 
fundamentals (5) are controlled for using time indicator variables. Just like with the industry 
indicators the use of time indicators will also eliminate the effect of trends in financial reporting 
complexity not captured by 10-Q word counts. 
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 4. Hypothesis testing 
Table 5 summarizes the Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in our analysis. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents correlation coefficients of the levels of the variables in our analysis. 
The sign and magnitude of these coefficients are generally consistent with prior literature. Panel 
B of Table 5 presents correlation coefficients for these variables' first-differences, which is the 
way these variables are introduced in our regressions. Consistent with our hypothesis, Panel B of 
Table 5 shows a positive and significant correlation between change in complexity 
(ΔCOMPLEXit) and change in peer comovement (ΔSYNCHit) of 0.02. This value corresponds to a 
correlation in the levels of the variables of 0.28. Correlation coefficients for levels and first-
differences are statistically significant at less than the 1% level. Also consistent with our 
hypothesis, change in average peer complexity (ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit) is positive (0.01) and 
statistically significant (p-value=0.03). While this is not a direct test of our hypothesis, this 
coefficient is also consistent with the theory that increases in complexity are associated with 
increases in comovement with peers. A complexity shock either on the firm of interest or on its 
peers should stimulate the acquisition of low cost signals, resulting in higher comovement. 
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Table 5 
Pooled correlation for variables used to determine the influence of complexity on peer stock comovement 
 
This table reports pairwise Pearson correlations for the variables used in our analysis. Panel A shows correlations of the variables' levels and Panel B shows 
correlations of the variables' first-differences. ΔSYNCHit is the change in peer group synchronicity around the filing date of the 10-Q, where synchronicity is 
measured as a log transformation of the R2 from a regression of firm returns on value-weighted peer group returns. ΔCOMPLEXit is the change from last quarter 
of the natural logarithm of the number of words in the 10-Q report. All other variables are described in detail in the Appendix. 
Panel A: Correlations of levels 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 SYNCHit 1.00               
                 
2 COMPLEXit 0.28 1.00              
 
 
(0.00)               
3 AVG_PR_COMPLEXit 0.29 0.47 1.00             
  (0.00) (0.00)              
4 QSIZEit 0.44 0.37 0.2 1.00            
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
5 MKT_SHAREit 0.1 0.05 -0.02 0.37 1.00           
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
6 ANALYSTSit 0.4 0.37 0.21 0.76 0.21 1.00          
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
7 INSTPERCit 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.46 0.13 0.47 1.00         
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
8 QBTMit -0.09 -0.05 0 -0.36 -0.02 -0.24 -0.07 1.00        
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
9 ROEit 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.1 -0.05 1.00       
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
10 LEVERAGEit 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.08 -0.04 0.12 1.00      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
11 DED_IOPERCit 0 -0.08 -0.16 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.04 1.00     
 
 
(0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)      
12 INFOit -0.03 0 -0.07 0 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 1.00    
 
 
(0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.49) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.18)     
13 OPACITYit -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0 -0.02 0.06 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00) (0.00)    
14 NOISEit -0.1 -0.13 -0.05 -0.22 -0.05 -0.2 -0.11 0.15 0 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 1.00  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.37)   
15 TURNOVERit 0.25 0.26 0.17 0.25 -0.02 0.36 0.28 -0.2 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.19 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00)  
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Panel B: Correlations of changes 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 ∆SYNCHit 1.00               
                 
2 ∆COMPLEXit 0.02 1.00              
 
 
(0.00)               
3 ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit 0.01 0.14 1.00             
  (0.03) (0.00)              
4 ∆QSIZEit 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.00            
 
 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.02)             
5 ∆MKT_SHAREit 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 1.00           
 
 
(0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)            
6 ∆ANALYSTSit 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.00 1.00          
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62)           
7 ∆INSTPERCit 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.01 0.05 1.00         
 
 
(0.00) (0.12) (0.18) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00)          
8 ΔQBTMit -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.84 0.01 -0.02 -0.14 1.00        
 
 
(0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)         
9 ∆ROEit 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.04 1.00       
 
 
(0.82) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.00)        
10 ∆LEVERAGEit -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.18 -0.15 1.00      
  (0.20) (0.08) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
11 ∆DED_IOPERCit -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.34 0.01 0.01 -0.02 1.00     
 
 
(0.00) (0.16) (0.00) (0.03) (0.22) (0.04) (0.00) (0.03) (0.12) (0.01)      
12 INFOit 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.15 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 1.00    
 
 
(0.45) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00)     
13 ∆OPACITYit 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.00   
  (0.96) (0.37) (0.22) (0.00) (0.94) (0.27) (0.03) (0.43) (0.12) (0.83) (0.80) (0.00)    
14 ∆NOISEit -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00  
  (0.21) (0.73) (0.20) (0.13) (0.63) (0.12) (0.58) (0.22) (0.28) (0.74) (0.05) (0.42) (0.63)   
15 ∆TURNOVERit 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.99) (0.01) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00)  
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We test our hypothesis in a multivariable setting by regressing changes in firm complexity on 
changes in peer comovement while controlling for changes in the complexity of the firm’s peers, 
information production, market frictions, and fixed effects. We fit the following pooled 
regression: 
ΔSYNCHit = β0 + β1ΔCOMPLEXit + β2∆AVG_PR_COMPLEXit + β3ΔQSIZEit + β4ΔMKT_SHAREit + 
β5ΔANALYSTSit + β6ΔINSTPERCit +β7∆QBTMit + β8∆ROEit + β9ΔLEVERAGEit+ β10ΔDED_IOPERCit+ 
β11ΔINFOit + β12ΔOPACITYit + β13ΔNOISEit + β14ΔTURNOVERit + εit,                                            (3) 
 
We expect a positive coefficient on ΔCOMPLEXit (i.e., β1 > 0) from equation (3). Control 
variables were discussed in section 3, and are formally defined in the Appendix. We include 
industry and year indicators to capture any unobservable industry and year fixed-effects. Industry 
indicator variables correspond to two-digit SIC codes. The F-test statistics for the joint 
significance of industry and year effects are 25.24 and 1.77, respectively, both statistically 
significant at the 1% level, thus justifying the use of two-way fixed effects. We use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by firm.  
Table 6 reports regression coefficients and their respective two-tailed p-values. Model (1) in 
Table 6 presents the baseline regression coefficient for ΔCOMPLEXit in a pooled regression 
without controls or fixed-effects. Model (2) in Table 6 presents regression coefficients for the 
pooled ordinary least squares regression without fixed-effects. Model (3) in Table 6 presents 
regression coefficients for the pooled ordinary least squares regression with year and industry 
indicators. Model (4) in Table 6 presents regression coefficients for the pooled ordinary least 
squares regression with year-industry indicators. This last specification is included to account for 
the potential presence of time-industry effects resulting from the implementation of accounting 
standards that could produce industry-specific increases in 10-Q lengths in certain periods and 
return synchronicity. 
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Table 6 
Influence of complexity on peer stock comovement - warranted multiples selection 
 
ΔSYNCHit = β0 + β1ΔCOMPLEXit + β2∆AVG_PR_COMPLEXit + β3ΔQSIZEit + β4ΔMKT_SHAREit + β5ΔANALYSTSit + β6ΔINSTPERCit 
+β7∆QBTMit + β8∆ROEit + β9LEVERAGEit + β10∆DED_IOPERCit + β11ΔINFOit + β12ΔOPACITYit + β13ΔNOISEit + β14ΔTURNOVERit + εit, 
  
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of ΔSYNCHit on ΔCOMPLEXit. Peer groups are identified following the method in Bhojraj and Lee 
(2002). ΔSYNCHit is the change in peer group synchronicity around the filing date of the 10-Q, where synchronicity is measured as a log transformation of the 
R2 from a regression of firm returns on value-weighted peer group returns. ΔCOMPLEXit is the change from last quarter of the natural logarithm of the number 
of words in the 10-Q report. Two tailed p-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. Industry effects are included using two-digit SIC codes. See the Appendix for a description of control variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit 
ΔCOMPLEXit 0.1016 (0.001) 0.0936 (0.003) 0.0964 (0.002) 0.0995 (0.002) 
ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit   0.0762 (0.171) 0.0836 (0.139) 0.0954 (0.100) 
ΔQSIZEit   0.4820 (0.000) 0.4390 (0.000) 0.4357 (0.000) 
ΔMKT_SHAREit   0.8643 (0.263) 0.6630 (0.390) 0.8237 (0.292) 
ΔANALYSTSit   0.1333 (0.048) 0.1504 (0.026) 0.1504 (0.029) 
ΔINSTPERCit   0.5264 (0.070) 0.5934 (0.042) 0.5683 (0.057) 
ΔQBTMit   0.0065 (0.952) -0.0624 (0.567) -0.0575 (0.604) 
ΔROEit   -0.1530 (0.538) -0.1429 (0.567) -0.1858 (0.462) 
ΔLEVERAGEit 
  
0.0032 (0.993) -0.1013 (0.792) -0.1340 (0.731) 
ΔDED_IOPERCit 
  
-1.8085 (0.001) -2.0319 (0.000) -2.0552 (0.001) 
INFOit 
  
-0.1136 (0.014) -0.0986 (0.034) -0.1070 (0.023) 
ΔOPACITYit 
  
-0.1001 (0.778) 0.0769 (0.833) 0.1036 (0.778) 
ΔNOISEit 
  
-0.1072 (0.201) -0.1338 (0.114) -0.1223 (0.155) 
ΔTURNOVERit 
  
0.0364 (0.009) 0.0272 (0.052) 0.0254 (0.075) 
. 
        CONSTANT 0.0239 (0.081) 0.0227 (0.249) 0.0977 (0.843) -0.4240 (0.000) 
  
        YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO YES (14) NO 
 INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS NO NO YES (54) NO 
 INDUSTRY/YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO NO 
 
YES (581) 
        
N  26,484   26,484   26,484   26,484  
Adj R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.012 0.008 
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Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a positive and significant coefficient for 
ΔCOMPLEXit in all model specifications. This coefficient remains remarkably unchanged after 
the introduction of control variables, year, industry, and year-industry effects. According to 
Model (3), the coefficient on ΔCOMPLEXit is 0.0964 (p-value0.002). This implies that holding 
all other variables constant, a one-standard-deviation increase in complexity induces an increase 
in R2 (at the mean) of 4.97%. This is a sizable amount if one considers that the average R2 for the 
sample is 10.60%, and the median is 4.50%. This coefficient suggests that complexity has a 
significant effect on stock correlations.21 
The coefficient estimate for change in average peer firm complexity 
(ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit) is positive, and only statistically significant from zero in Model (4), at 
the 10 percent level (however, using one-tailed tests the coefficients are statistically significant 
across all specifications). The coefficient estimate for increases in firm size (ΔQSIZEit) is 
positive and significant (0.4390, p-value<0.001). As discussed above, the sign on this variable is 
difficult to interpret because size proxies for many firm attributes (including complexity and the 
information environment which have competing predictions). That said, the results indicate that 
as firms grow larger, they tend to comove more strongly with their peers.  
Coefficient estimates for the change in market share (ΔMKT_SHAREit), change in return on 
equity (∆ROEit), change in the book-to-market ratio (∆QBTMit), change in leverage 
(ΔLEVERAGEit), change in opacity (ΔOPACITYit), and change in noise (ΔNOISEit) are 
statistically insignificant.  
21 Our predictions center on unexpected increases in reporting complexity. For completeness we include the entire 
distribution of ΔCOMPLEXit in our analysis. However, it is not necessarily clear that decreases in complexity should 
translate into decreases in comovement. In untabulated analysis we find stronger economic significance when we 
exclude decreases in ΔCOMPLEXit from our analysis. Thus, the effects documented may understate the effect of 
unexpected complexity on peer return comovement. 
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The coefficient estimate for ΔANALYSTSit is positive (0.1504, p-value=0.026). This implies 
that increases in analyst coverage on a stock results in increases in the correlation between a 
stock and its peers. Again, we caution the reader on the interpretation of these variables given 
that analysts tend to be attracted to more complex firms (Lehavy et al., 2011) and size, market 
share, performance, book-to-market, leverage, and analyst following are also associated with 
information production.  
Turning to our information production proxies we find that regression coefficients for 
dedicated institutional ownership (ΔDED_IOPERCit) and the presence of news grabbing events 
at the time of the complexity shock (INFOit) are both negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The coefficient estimate for dedicated institutional ownership is -2.0319 (p-
value<0.001). This indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of shares 
owned by dedicated financial institutions results in a reduction in peer comovement of 5.32%. 
These results are in line with Veldkamp’s (2006) prediction that increases in information 
production disincentivize low-cost information acquisition and reduce comovement. The 
coefficient estimate for non-dedicated institutional ownership (ΔINSTPERCit), is positive and 
significant (0.5934 p-value=0.042). The opposite signs of the regression coefficients for 
dedicated financial institutions (negative) and non-dedicated financial institutions (positive) are 
also consistent with information choice theory, and with Bushee’s (2001) institutional investor 
classification. As dedicated institutional ownership is more likely to increase demand for firm-
specific information than other investors (i.e., indexers and speculators), the presence of 
dedicated institutions should reduce comovement, while the presence of non-dedicated 
institutions should increase it.  
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Finally, we observe that increases in firm turnover, the result of reductions in market 
frictions, lead to increases in peer correlations. This could indicate a more synchronized response 
of prices to new information as market frictions subside and prices become more informative.  
 
5. Additional Analysis 
5.1 Random Peer Assignment 
As explained in Section 3, we construct our sample following Bhojraj and Lee (2002), in an 
attempt to mimic the peer selection process of an analyst or investor that identifies peers by 
comparing financial ratios and reviewing soft information. However, there is a concern that the 
extensive data requirements in Bhojraj and Lee (2002) might have biased our sample towards 
large stocks with naturally high comovement with other stocks. If that were the case our Table 6 
results could be the result of sample selection bias and not be representative of the economic 
relation between complexity and comovement. To make sure that our results are robust to 
alternative peer matching procedures, we devise an alternative, and much simpler, peer group 
formation method by choosing at random four stocks from the firm's two-digit SIC industry code 
to serve as peers. These firms will share the firm of interest's industry affiliation but could have 
other characteristics when it comes to size, age, or level of horizontal or vertical integration. This 
new matching eliminates many of the data restrictions that limited the size of our sample. The 
new sample consists of 43,231 firm-quarter observations, almost twice as many observations as 
the original sample. We fit the regression in Equation (3) on the new sample and find results 
consistent with a positive relationship between increases in complexity and increases in 
comovement.  
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Consistent with Table 6, the coefficients on ΔCOMPLEXit in Table 7 are positive. However, 
statistical significance at conventional levels is only achieved in one-tailed tests, except in Model 
(1) where no control variables are included (two-tailed tests tabulated). Also consistent with 
Table 6, the coefficient on changes in average peer firm complexity (ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit) is 
positive (0.3650), but in this specification is highly statistically significant (p-value<0.001). 
These results suggest that when using random peer assignment the dominant effect appears to be 
through increases in average peer firm complexity, perhaps due to the less precise peer 
assignment process. Overall, it is not just that complexity shocks in the firm of interest result in 
higher peer comovement, it is also complexity shocks affecting the firm’s peers as well. A one-
standard-deviation increase in the change in average peer complexity induces a change in R2 (at 
the mean) of 11.66%. Taken together, these results provide additional evidence consistent with 
our hypothesis that investors respond to complexity shocks by acquiring low-cost information, 
which generates excess comovement.  
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Table 7 
Influence of complexity on peer stock comovement - random within-industry selection 
 
ΔSYNCHit = β0 + β1ΔCOMPLEXit + β2∆AVG_PR_COMPLEXit + β3ΔQSIZEit + β4ΔMKT_SHAREit + β5ΔANALYSTSit + β6ΔINSTPERCit 
+β7∆QBTMit + β8∆ROEit + β9LEVERAGEit + β10∆DED_IOPERCit + β11ΔINFOit + β12ΔOPACITYit + β13ΔNOISEit + β14ΔTURNOVERit + εit 
  
This table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of ΔSYNCHit on ΔCOMPLEXit. Peer groups are four firms chosen at random within the firm's two-
digit SIC industry. ΔSYNCHit is the change in peer group synchronicity around the filing date of the 10-Q, where synchronicity is measured as a log 
transformation of the R2 from a regression of firm returns on value-weighted peer group returns. ΔCOMPLEXit is the change from last quarter of the natural 
logarithm of the number of words in the 10-Q report. Two tailed p-values (to the right of coefficient estimates) are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm. Industry effects are included using two-digit SIC codes. See the Appendix for a description of control variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit ΔSYNCHit 
ΔCOMPLEXit 0.0732 (0.004) 0.0382 (0.136) 0.0417 (0.106) 0.0413 (0.114) 
ΔAVG_PR_COMPLEXit   0.3286 (0.000) 0.3650 (0.000) 0.5307 (0.000) 
ΔQSIZEit   0.4629 (0.000) 0.4192 (0.000) 0.3925 (0.000) 
ΔMKT_SHAREit   -0.7955 (0.317) -0.9313 (0.242) -0.7421 (0.357) 
ΔANALYSTSit   -0.1446 (0.008) -0.1143 (0.038) -0.1141 (0.039) 
ΔINSTPERCit   0.6738 (0.008) 0.5861 (0.023) 0.5989 (0.020) 
ΔQBTMit   0.1055 (0.163) 0.0555 (0.464) 0.0555 (0.470) 
ΔROEit   0.0829 (0.415) 0.0821 (0.423) 0.0712 (0.489) 
ΔLEVERAGEit. 
  
0.4362 (0.109) 0.2864 (0.292) 0.2275 (0.404) 
ΔDED_IOPERCit 
  
-2.4605 (0.000) -2.6108 (0.000) -2.7690 (0.000) 
INFOit 
  
-0.1114 (0.002) -0.1004 (0.006) -0.1041 (0.005) 
ΔOPACITYit. 
  
0.4676 (0.080) 0.3850 (0.168) 0.4155 (0.138) 
ΔNOISEit 
  
-0.1352 (0.038) -0.1707 (0.009) -0.1511 (0.022) 
ΔTURNOVERit 
  
0.0522 (0.000) 0.0470 (0.000) 0.0506 (0.000) 
. 
        CONSTANT 0.0519 (0.000) 0.0353 (0.039) 0.2519 (0.621) 3.1446 (0.000) 
  
        YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO YES (14) NO 
 INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS NO NO YES (62) NO 
 INDUSTRY/YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO NO 
 
YES (636) 
        
N  43,231   43,231   43,231   43,231  
Adj R-squared 0.0002 0.0062 0.0121 0.0211 
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5.2 Changes in 10-K Length 
Because we are interested in unexpected increases in financial reporting complexity, our primary 
analysis focuses on the shortest window of SEC reporting (quarterly reports). Alternatively, 
annual reports could be used. However, since a great deal of reporting activity occurs between 
each 10-K filing, we expect that annual reports will be a weaker setting to test our prediction. In 
addition, we also expect the information environment surrounding 10-K filings to be stronger, 
relative to 10-Q filings. Consistent with these expectations, substituting changes in 10-K length 
as our measure of financial reporting complexity and examining changes in comovement of the 
peer portfolio around the 10-K filing produces insignificant results. Overall, this suggests that 
changes in 10-K length either are not unexpected, and/or are more easily remedied by a more 
robust information environment and therefore do not produce the same consequences as changes 
in 10-Q length. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We use information choice principles to explain investors’ reaction to complexity shocks (e.g., 
Veldkamp, 2006; Chamley, 2007; Ganguli and Yang, 2009; Manzano and Vives, 2011; Mele and 
Sangiorgi, 2015). We propose and show that investors respond to complexity shocks in quarterly 
reports by increasing demand for low-price information on the stock. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find a positive relation between changes in 10-Q word counts, our complexity 
proxy, and changes in 1) the number of internet searches on the stock and 2) the R2 of the 
regression of stock returns on the average returns of its four closest peers. These results arise 
because, consistent with Veldkamp’s (2006) prediction, return comovement increases when 
investors acquire more low-price information signals. We observe this positive relation for 
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complexity shocks in the firm of interest and find some evidence that this positive relation also 
exists for complexity shocks in its strategic peers. 
Throughout our tests, we take great care to differentiate between comovement increases 
caused by complexity shocks and comovement increases caused by lower information 
production and higher market frictions. Isolating the effect of complexity shocks on comovement 
from the effect of changes in information production pose a significant challenge because most 
of the traditional information production measures in the literature are positively related to 
complexity. For this reason, we introduce two alternative information production proxies: 
institutional ownership of dedicated financial institutions and an indicator that takes the value of 
one when the complexity shock coincides with a corporate news-grabbing event. The regression 
coefficients from these variables are consistent with prior literature and show a negative relation 
between comovement and information production. This suggests that the effect of complexity 
shocks on the firm’s information environment can be, at least partially, offset by the production 
of news and analysis from other sources. In this regard, the role of dedicated financial 
institutions to reveal firm-specific information through their trades seems particularly important.  
One limitation of our study, that is a limitation of all studies using a length based proxy for 
financial reporting complexity, is that the exact source of underlying complexity that investors 
face cannot be precisely identified. As Loughran and McDonald note, complexity and readability 
cannot really be disentangled (2014, pg. 1646). Future research in this area could work to 
disentangle these effects. 
Our study contributes by providing empirical evidence that complexity generates excess 
comovement. This seems to indicate that investors see complexity shocks and reductions in 
transparency as equivalent. So far, existing studies had only demonstrated that comovement 
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increased in response to reductions in the number of information signals (Jin and Myers, 2006; 
Hutton et al., 2009; Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte, 2010; Hameed, Morck, Shen, and 
Yeung, 2015).  
Although we take a modest first step at incorporating information choice concepts into the 
broad accounting narratives literature, the results from our study might have broader implications 
for other actively researched areas of Accounting and Finance. For instance, even though we 
obtain evidence suggesting that investors respond to more complex accounting reports by 
demanding information from other sources, we do not know with certainty how effective this 
strategy is at mitigating uncertainty. Predictions from general equilibrium models with 
endogenous information acquisition (Clinch and Lombardi, 2011; Opp, 2015; Han and Yang, 
2013) are contradictory and highly dependent on model assumptions. This leaves managers and 
regulators with no definite answer on how complexity influences cost of capital. The use of 
measures derived from quantitative and qualitative aspects of accounting narratives could prove 
beneficial as we test these models empirically.  
Finally, our results might also prove useful to understand the economic importance of 
accounting information complexity on market efficiency. Users, preparers and regulators have 
highlighted the importance of accounting information’s attributes for a well-functioning capital 
market, with obvious consequences for the economy at large. However, if investors are able to 
stimulate the release of private information from other sources by increasing their demand, it is 
possible that the effects of complexity on market efficiency might be smaller than anticipated. 
Additional studies that link measures derived from accounting narratives with market efficiency 
proxies could help address this question. Some examples of possible areas of future research 
could include studying how changes in the reporting environment impacts comovement among 
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firms, such as Regulation Fair Disclosure, the Plain English Initiative, and the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act.  
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
 
This appendix reports details about the calculation of variables used in our analysis. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to control for outliers. Unless otherwise 
noted, variable names identified in the definition column correspond to the quarterly 
COMPUSTAT Xpressfeed data set or the CRSP data set. 
Variable Definition 
Peer Stock Comovement Variables 
R2 The coefficient of determination from estimation of the following model: 
 RETit = β1 + β2PEER_RETit + εit 
 where RET is the returns for firm i, and PEER_RET are value-weighted returns for the 
4 closest peer firms identified during the fiscal year. The model is estimated using 
daily returns, for each of the two following periods: (1) the three month period before 
the filing of the 10-Q and (2) the three month period following the filing of the 10-Q. 
The month of filing of the 10-Q is excluded from both periods. 
SYNCH it ln(R2/(1-R2)) for the three month period following the filing of the 10-Q.  
ΔSYNCH it The change in peer group synchronicity around the filing of the 10-Q.  
 Financial Reporting Complexity Variables 
RAW_WORDS it The number of words in the 10-Q. 
COMPLEX it The natural logarithm of the number of words in the 10-Q.  
ΔCOMPLEX it 
AVG_PR_COMPLEXit 
The change in COMPLEX from the prior 10-Q.  
The mean of COMPLEX for the members of the identified peer group. 
∆AVG_PR_COMPLEXit The change in AVG_PR_COMPLEX. 
 
  Other Control Variables for Tests of Influence of Complexity on Peer Stock Comovement 
ANALYSTS it The natural logarithm of one plus the number of individual analyst earnings estimates 
as of the end of the quarter. 
ΔANALYSTS it The quarterly change in ANALYSTS. 
DED_IOPERCit The percentage of dedicated institutional ownership as classified in Bushee (2001). 
ΔDED_IOPERC it The quarterly change in DED_IOPERC. 
INFO it An indicator for the presence of any of the following events: (1) Debt issuance proxied 
by a firm’s change in long-term debt being in the top decile, (2) Equity issuance 
proxied by a firm’s change in shares issued being in the top decile, (3) a stock split in 
the 3 month’s leading up to the filing of the 10-Q, or (4) a special dividend issuance in 
the 3 month’s leading up to the filing of the 10-Q, zero otherwise. 
INSTPERC it The percentage of institutional ownership measured as the sum of non-dedicated 
shares/shares outstanding. Where non-dedicated shares are all institutional shares held 
at the end of the quarter, except dedicated shares as classified in Bushee (2001). 
ΔINSTPERC it The quarterly change in INSTPERC.  
LEVERAGEit Total liabilities scaled by total assets (ltq/atq). 
ΔLEVERAGEit The quarterly change in leverage. 
MKT_SHAREit The percentage of market share by four-digit SIC code based on sales for the quarter. 
∆MKT_SHAREit The quarterly change in MKT_SHARE. 
OPACITYit Discretionary accruals, defined as the residuals from a performance controlled Jones 
(1991) regression as outlined in Kothari et al. (2005). 
ΔOPACITYit The quarterly change in Opacity. 
NOISEit -1 multiplied by the correlation coefficient between daily returns and lagged daily 
returns for each of the two following periods: (1) the three month period before the 
filing of the 10-Q and (2) the three month period following the filing of the 10-Q. The 
month of filing of the 10-Q is excluded from both periods. 
ΔNOISE it The change in NOISE around the filing of the 10-Q.  
QBTM it The natural logarithm of book-to-market. ln(ceqq/(prccq*cshoq)).  
ΔQBTM it The quarterly change in QBTM.  
QSIZE it ln(prccq*cshoq).  
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ΔQSIZE it The quarterly change in QSIZE.  
ROEit Earnings (ibq) scaled by equity (either seqq, ceqq+pstkq, or atq-ltq, in that order). 
ΔROEit The quarterly change in return on equity. 
TURNOVER it vol/shrout as of the end of the quarter taken from CRSP.  
ΔTURNOVER it The quarterly change in TURNOVER.  
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